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DUE PROCESS AND DEEDS OF TRUST-
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?
David A. Leen,* Peter A. Galbraith,t and John Gantt
The operative effect of the Washington Deed of Trust Act1 has
been altered by various legal developments since its creation in 1965.
The 1967 amendments to the Act, legislation authorizing use of a
master form deed of trust,3 and the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 are
a few such developments. 4 However, no development subsequent to
the Act's inception has had potentially greater impact than the
evolving concept of procedural due process. The Washington courts
have contributed to this constitutional evolution,5 following closely a
series of United States Supreme Court decisions holding that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment precludes a state from
* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; Reginald Heber Smith Fellow; Staff Attor-
ney, Seattle Legal Services; B.A., Beloit College, 1968; J.D., University of Oregon,
1971.
t Second year law student, University of Washington; B.A., University of Pennsyl-
vania, 1969.
t Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; Director of Litigation, Seattle Legal Ser-
vices; B.A., University of Arizona, 1964; J.D., Cornell University, 1967.
1. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 61.24 (Supp. 1972).
2. Ch. 30 [1967] Wash. Sess. Laws 101. See text accompanying notes 17-19 infra.
3. Ch. 148 [1967] Wash. Sess. Laws 711, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 65.08 (Supp. 1972).
The section provides that a deed of trust or mortgage may be recorded and serve as con-
structive notice when the deed or mortgage incorporates the form by reference. Wash-
ington Mortgage Correspondents Association, a Washington corporation, recorded a
master form deed of trust on June 12, 1967, with the Auditor of King County, Wash-
ington (Auditor file No. 6188051). Similar documents were filed in each county in
Washington.
4. Pub. Law No. 89-719, § 108, 26 U.S.C: § 7425 (1970). In essence the Act pro-
vides that a junior federal tax lien (which is of record more than thirty days before the
sale) is extinguished by a private foreclosure sale (which includes a trustee's sale) if the
Internal Revenue Service [IRS] receives notice twenty-five days prior to the sale, but
that the IRS has a right of redemption for "a period of 120 days from the date of such
sale or the period allowable by state law, whichever is longer." Id. (emphasis added). The
amount the IRS must pay to redeem the property is the amount legally satisfied by
reason of the sale. As a deficiency judgment is prohibited in a private deed of trust fore-
closure, WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.100 (Supp. 1972), the amount legally realized at the
sale will usually be the balance of the outstanding obligation. See generally Sanders &
McDonald, Non-Judicial Foreclosures and the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 24 Sw.
L.J. 815 (1970).
5. See Seattle Credit Bureau v. Hibbitt, 7 Wn. App. 219, 499 P.2d 92 (1972); Lucas
v. Stapp, 6 Wn. App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (1972). Both decisions are discussed in note 27
infra.
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depriving a person of a significant interest in property without prior
notice and an opportunity to be heard.6
This article analyzes the potential effect of this constitutional devel-
opment on the Washington Deed of Trust Act. In addition to de-
scribing the Act and examining its possible constitutional defects, the
article briefly discusses the policy questions involved and suggests
general guidelines for change.
I. THE WASHINGTON DEED OF TRUST ACT
Trust deed financing is a three-party arrangement in which the bor-
rower (grantor) deeds real property to a trustee who holds the deed to
protect the lender's (beneficiary's) interest. 7 Although trust deeds have
been used in Washington for over half a century, lending institutions
were not attracted to this financing device until 1965.8 Prior to 1965,
trust deeds had to be foreclosed judicially and offered little advantage
over conventional mortgages.51 With the passage of the Washington
Deed of Trust Act of 1965, trust deed financing became the most
widely used security device in real property transactions in Wash-
ington state.
The 1965 Act added two features to trust deed financing which
made it the preferable means of handling real property security trans-
actions. First, the Act authorized nonjudicial sales of secured property
6. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
7. See Gose, The Trust Deed Act in Washington, 41 WASH. L. REv. 94 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Gose].
8. Id. at 94.
9. Id. See also Shattuck, Real Property Mortgage Foreclosure-Redemption, 36
WASH. L. REv. 309, 310 (1961). Foreclosure of conventional mortgages in Washington
requires a time consuming judicial process that culminates in a sale which does not vest
title in the purchaser. The delay between the original default on the mortgage and the
judicial sale can be lengthy; this coupled with the borrower's statutory one year redemp-
tion period (eight months if the mortgagee waives a deficiency judgment and the prop-
erty is nonagricultural), WASH. REV. CODE § 6.24.140 (Supp. 1972), which includes the
right to continued possession of the property if the borrower filed a homestead exemp-
tion prior to the sale and occupies the land as a homestead at the time of the sale, id. §
6.24.2 10, can extend the total time required to vest title in the lender to fifteen months
and beyond. The right to possession of a homestead during the redemption period ap-
plies even after the judicial foreclosure of a purchase money mortgage. See First Nat'l
Bank v. Tiffany, 40 Wn. 2d 193, 242 P.2d 169 (1952). Although the lender is entitled to
a deficiency judgment if appropriate, it has been argued that a delay in excess of fifteen
months in acquiring title after default can inhibit mortgage financing. See Comment.
Statutory Redemption: The Enemy of Home Financing, 28 WASH. L. REV. 39 (1953).
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by the trustee six months following default, provided the deed con-
tained a power of sale and a judicial foreclosure action was not
pending.10 This feature obviated the necessity of incurring the exces-
sive delay and high costs inherent in judicially supervised foreclosures."
Second, the Act stripped debtors and junior security holders of their
statutory right of redemption following sale.' 2 Thus, in a sale made
pursuant to the 1965 Act the purchaser gets immediate title to the
land and need not wait for the debtor and junior security holders to
fail to exercise their redemption rights. However, the lender desirous
of exploiting these features of the 1965 Act must pay a price-the Act
precludes recovery of a deficiency judgment.' 3
Under the 1965 Act, as amended in 1967, a lender-beneficiary can
invoke the private sale provision of a trust deed simply by requesting
the trustee to issue the required statutory notice indicating that the
sale will be held in 120 days.' 4 The arrearage (payments of principal
and interest presently due) must be set forth in the notice, but trustee
costs, which include attorney fees and other incidental costs of the
sale, need not be disclosed.15 Generally, the debtor must contact the
trustee to ascertain the total amount of money which must be paid in
order to discontinue the sale. The debtor, any beneficiary under a
subordinate trust deed, and any subordinate lienholder of record may
prevent the sale by curing the default prior to the date set for the sale. 16
In 1967 the Washington Legislature approved amendments to the
1965 Act designed to reduce the time and expense of selling real prop-
erty secured under a deed of trust after default. The minimum statu-
tory notice time, formerly 180 days, was reduced to the present min-
imum of 120 days.' 7 Trustees now are authorized to activate private
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.030 (Supp. 1972). In addition to the requirements
noted in the text, four other requirements must be met to foreclose under the 1965 Act:
(1) the trust deed must provide that the property is not used for'agricultural or farming
purposes; (2) a default must have occurred which by the terms of the deed makes opera-
tive the power of sale; (3) no action on an obligation secured by the deed can be
pending; and (4) the deed must have been recorded in the county where the land is situ-
ated. Id.
11. Gose at 95. See note 9 supra.
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.050 (Supp. 1972) provides: "After sale, as in this
chapter provided, no person shall have any right by statute or otherwise to redeem
from the deed of trust or from the sale." See also note 9 supra.
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.100 (Supp. 1972).
14. Id. § 61.24.040.
15. Id. See also note 132 infra.
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.090 (Supp. 1972).
17. Id. § 61.24.040.
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sale deed provisions and pursue nonjudicial realization procedures
even though a judicial foreclosure is pending.18 Finally, the amend-
ments allow a subordinate lienholder of record who prevents a private
sale by curing the default to add the costs incurred in curing the de-
fault, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to his lien. 19
Recent judicial developments subject the continued vitality of the
Washington Deed of Trust Act to serious doubt, for the growth of
procedural due process raises serious questions as to the constitu-
tionality of its nonjudicial sale provisions. As business necessity de-
mands a predictive analysis of the validity of nonjudicial sale provi-
sions in deeds of trust, it is essential to examine in detail the relation
between procedural due process and deeds of trust.
II. DUE PROCESS AND DEEDS OF TRUST
A. The Rise of Procedural Due Process
The rapid growth of procedural due process 20 is one of the most
startling judicial developments in recent years.2 ' While due process
was early held to require notice and an opportunity to be heard, 22
more recently it has been held that such notice and opportunity to be
heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner. '23 In a series of cases24 beginning in 1969 with Sniadach v.
18. Id. See Gose at 100-01. A lender is still forbidden from foreclosing privately if
it has already begun judicial foreclosure proceedings. WASH. REV. CooE § 61.24.030(4)
(Supp. 1972).
19. Id. § 61.24.090.
20. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: " [N] or
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. The recent developments in procedural due process have been the subject of
voluminous commentary in legal periodicals. For an extensive treatment of the most
recent procedural due process case, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), see 48 WASH.
L. REV. 646, 649-60 (1973).
22. "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order
that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. Common justice requires that
no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity
to make his defense." Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863) (citations omitted).
23. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
24. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (notice and an opportunity to be
heard required before a debtor's property can be seized in a prejudgment replevin ac-
tion); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (notice and a hearing required before a
state may deprive the father of illegitimate children of the custody of such children after
the death of the mother); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (197 1) (notice and a hearing re-
quired before a state may suspend a driver's license under an uninsured motorist
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Family Finance Corp.25 and extending most recently to Fuentes v.
Shevin,26 the United States Supreme Court has focused primarily
upon the "meaningful time" requirement and has gradually developed
the applicable procedural due process standard: Absent a valid waiver
and except in extraordinary situations, due process requires notice and
an opportunity to be heard before any person can be deprived of any
significant property interest by state action.27 While this basic stan-
dard is far from self-explanatory, it is useful to examine the meaning
of the key phrases by applying the due process standard to a typical
deed of trust foreclosure.
B. Does Procedural Due Process Apply to Deeds of Trust?
1. Does the Borrower Have a "Significant Properly Interest"?
A borrower in a deed of trust arrangement has legal title and an
equitable interest in the land being purchased; the trustee has only a
lien on the land.28 This interest in land is clearly a sufficient property
interest to require due process protections. One of the primary reasons
for the growth of the concept of procedural due process in recent
years has been the expansive reading given the term "property." In the
words of the Fuentes Court, "The Fourteenth Amendment's protection
of 'property', however, has never been interpreted to safeguard only
statute); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (states are prohibited from denying
access to courts in divorce actions solely because of inability to pay court costs); Wis-
consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (state excessive drinking statute which
allowed local police to prohibit liquor sales to named person without prior notice and
hearing held unconstitutional); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (notice and a
hearing required before welfare payments are suspended pending a later hearing); and
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (notice and an opportunity to be
heard required prior to prejudgment garnishment of wages).
25. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
26. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
27. State courts have independently developed a similar due process standard. See,
e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. App. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 702(197 1), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972) (prejudgment attachment without prior notice
and a hearing unconstitutional). The Washington courts have kept pace with the due
process developments. See Seattle Credit Bureau v. Hibbitt, 7 Wn. App. 219, 499 P.2d
92 (1972) (holding in Lucas, infra, applied to a creditor with a security interest in prop-
erty); Lucas v. Stapp, 6 Wn. App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (1972) (Washington's attachment
statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.020(10) (1959), held unconstitutional because of
failure to provide for prior notice and a hearing); see the discussion of Lucas and
Hibbitt in 48 WASH. L. REV. 646, 653-54 (1973).
28. SeeGoseat 103.
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the rights of undisputed ownership. Rather it has been read broadly to
extend protection to 'any significant property interest'....29
Indeed it has! Recent decisions have interpreted "any significant
property interest" to include the right to: use and possession of house-
hold goods (a stove and stereo) in which the seller retained a security
interest;30 custody of one's illegitimate children after the mother's
death;31 continued possession of a driver's license;32 access to state
courts to judicially dissolve a marriage;33 preservation of a person's
reputation, honor, or integrity;34 a statutory entitlement to continued
welfare benefits; 35 and use of a person's wages.3 6 However, a tenant
in a periodic month-to-month tenancy has a significant property inter-
est-the right to continued use and possession of rented property
-- only if the rent has been paid and all the covenants of the lease have
been honored.37
Surely the borrower's interest in land held pursuant to a deed of
trust falls within this expanded definition. The borrower has an equi-
table interest in the land which can be freely alienated, subject of
course to the outstanding obligation. Moreover, the borrower has a
right to use and possession of the land which he can exercise himself
or transfer to another through a lease agreement.
2. Is There a "Deprivation" and When Does It Occur?
The borrower under a trust deed loses all of his interests in the land
when the trustee's sale occurs. The Washington Deed of Trust Act
expressly provides that there is no right of redemption after the trus-
tee's sale.38 By statute, the purchaser at the trustee's sale is entitled to
29. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86, citing Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379.
30. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 70, 86. Fuentes has clarified that the property in question
need not be a "necessity of life" to merit due process protections. Id. at 88-90.
31. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
32. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
33. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
34. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (197 1).
35. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
36. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64-67 (1972). Tenants do not have a right to
continued possession of rented premises without paying rent while the alleged wrong-
doings of the landlord are litigated. Hence, it is appropriate for an unlawful detainer
statute to provide for an expedited trial limited to determining if the monthly rental has
been paid and the covenants of the lease honored. See the discussion of Lindsey in
note 157 infra.
38. See note 12 supra.
768
Vol. 48: 763, 1973
Due Process and Deeds of Trust
possession twenty days after sale and is expressly authorized to bring a
summary unlawful detainer proceeding to obtain such possession.39
Hence, the trustee's sale is an overt and (with the exception of the bor-
rower's implied right to possession for twenty days after sale) com-
plete deprivation of all of the borrower's interest in the land.
In return for the loss of all of his interest in the land, the borrower
theoretically receives the proceeds of the trustee's sale. If those pro-
ceeds equal the fair market value of the property, it can be argued
that no deprivation occurs. In Strutt v. Ontario Savings and Loan
Association,40 a California appeals court found that because the fair
market value of the borrower's property at the time of the trustee's
sale did not exceed the balances due on two trust deed notes plus the
costs of sale, "the plaintiff had no equity in the real property at the
time of the trustee's sale and has suffered no damages as a result
thereof."41 While the Strutt court's analysis may be incorrect even
given the particular facts of the case because the court failed to ac-
knowledge that the costs of the trustee's sale are paid out of the bor-
rower's equity in the land,42 as the California court later noted, "it is
common knowledge that at forced sales such as a trustee's sale the full
potential value of the property being sold is rarely realized, and, in
fact, [the lender] was the only bidder at the trustee's sale."43 Because
the costs of the trustee's sale must be paid out of the proceeds of the
artificially low sale price, only the exceptional borrower receives any
compensation for his equity in the land. A more likely outcome is that
the amount realized at the trustee's sale will equal the amount due on
the outstanding trust note, with the result that the borrower receives
no compensation for his equity in the land. This uncompensated loss
of equity is an obvious deprivation.
In addition to the trustee's sale, an earlier, more subtle deprivation
of a significant property interest also may occur. The Washington
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.060 (Supp. 1972).
40. 28 Cal. App. 3d 866, 105 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1972). See also the discussion of Strutt
in note 145 infra.
41. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
42. Even if the amount of the bid at the trustee's sale is the fair market value of the
property, the proceeds of the sale are first applied to the expense of the sale. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 61.24.080(1) (Supp. 1972). As the trustee's sale is being forced upon a bor-
rower who may not wish to sell, even at fair market value, the resulting loss of equity(the expenses of the sale) would appear to be a deprivation.
43. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
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Deed of Trust Act provides that "at least one hundred and twenty
days before [the trustee's] sale, notice thereof shall be recorded in the
office of the auditor in each county in which the deed is recorded." 44
The statutorily required recording of the notice of sale 120 days be-
fore the trustee's sale may be a significant deprivation of property
because: (1) it substantially reduces the alienability of the borrower's
interests in the land, and (2) it substantially reduces the borrower's
equity in the land. Although on first reading this suggestion may seem
untenable, a close examination of the recent due process decisions re-
veals substantial support for this conclusion, 45 for in addition to
giving the concept of "property" a broad reading, the recent cases also
have expanded significantly the interpretation of "deprivation."
The touchstone of a discussion of the concept of "deprivation" is
Justice Harlan's definition in Sniadach. Harlan concluded that any
deprivation which "cannot be characterized as de minimis . . . must
be accorded the usual requisites of procedural due process: notice and
a prior hearing. '46 While the term de minimis is not self-defining, the
recent procedural due process cases provide useful illustrations of
what is not a de minimis deprivation. In the words of the Fuentes
Court, "[I] t is now well-settled that a temporary, non-final depriva-
tion of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in terms of the Four-
teenth Amendment. '47 Hence, the Supreme Court has held that a de-
privation includes a temporary freeze of wages caused by a prejudg-
ment writ of garnishment,48 a temporary termination of welfare bene-
fits pending a fair hearing, 49 a temporary seizure of household goods
pursuant to a prejudgment writ of replevin, 50 and the temporary sus-
pension of a driver's license until the posting of the security necessary
to cover potential claims arising from a traffic accident. 51 Using this
expanded definition of "deprivation," it is essential to identify exactly
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.040 (Supp. 1972). The California deed of trust statute.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924 (West Supp. 1973), provides for the recording of a notice of de-
fault three months before the trustee's sale.
45. For a 1970 federal district court decision which concludes the opposite, see note
121 and accompanying text infra.
46. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
47. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 84-85, citing Sniadach and Bell.
48. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
49. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
50. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
51. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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what a borrower is deprived of at the time of the recording of the no-
tice of trustee's sale and to determine whether that deprivation is de
minimis.
(a) Alienability. The nature of the deprivation cannot be described
adequately in a readily recognizable phrase. Perhaps the most precise
description is that a person is deprived of the right to freely alienate
his interest in the land and to receive the fair market value of that in-
terest. Fair market value is defined as: "the amount of money which a
purchaser willing but not obliged to buy the property would pay an
owner willing but not obliged to sell it, taking into consideration all
the uses for which the land was suited and might in reason be ap-
plied."5 When the notice of sale is recorded, any potential purchaser
has record notice that the borrower is not "an owner willing but not
obliged to sell" the property. While the borrower may still alienate his
interest in the property after the recording of the notice of sale, it is
highly unlikely that he will receive a reasonable approximation of its
fair market value.5 3
Ownership of an interest in property, real or personal, surely in-
cludes the right to sell the interest at any time and for a meaningful
price, usually fair market value. It also includes the ability to use the
property interest as security or collateral for a loan. Whatever the
label given these abilities, a borrower's proverbial bundle of sticks in-
cludes the ability to mortgage, convey, or assign his interest in the
land, however large or small it may be, and to receive a reasonable
approximation of the fair market value of that interest. We shall label
this particular stick "alienability." Is the borrower deprived of the al-
ienability of his property interest when the notice of sale is recorded?
To answer this question, it is helpful to turn to analogous situations
involving the attachment of real property or the filing of a lis pendens.54
R.C.W. § 7.12.020(lO), 55 the most commonly used section of Wash-
ington's attachment statute, has been found unconstitutional on due
52. P. NICHOLS, THE LAW O-F EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.2 [ I] (Sackman ed. 1971).
53. It is certain that "[f] orced sales, such as .. . a sale under a deed of
trust . .. do not show market value." Id. § 12.3113 [ 1]. It seems likely that the sale of
property after the recording of the notice of sale also will not reflect fair market value
because the willing seller-willing buyer test is not met.
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.320 (1959). Generally speaking, a lis pendens cofisti-
tutes an inchoate lien on the property in question.
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.020(10) (1959).
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process grounds in Lucas v. Stapp56 and Seattle Credit Bureau v.
Hibbitt.57 While the property involved in Lucas and Hibbitt was per-
sonalty,58 the reasoning of the two cases applies equally to real prop-
erty. Although personal property is attached by having the sheriff take
it into his possession, 59 whereas real property is attached less dramati-
cally by sending a notice to the county auditor for inclusion in the re-
cording index, 60 a significant deprivation of property occurs in both
cases. As one commentator has suggested: 61
It is true that generally prejudgment attachment of realty will not de-
prive the owner of the use and "drive him to the wall," but in a very
practical sense it will be a significant restriction on alienation. If, for
example, realty were the only available asset to be converted into
money to use for family necessities or to defend the lawsuit, the owner
would have great difficulty selling or mortgaging the property subject
to the attachment lien.
Thus prejudgment attachment of real property affects the alienability
of the property by clouding the owner's title or equitable interest.
The filing of a lis pendens has a similar effect on the alienability of
real property. 62 The Washington Supreme Court early declared in
Washington Dredging & Improvement Co. v. Kinnear:63
The lis pendens is evidently viewed by law as a cloud on the title to
land which it describes. The [owners] have an undoubted right to
have that cloud removed. The order of the court refusing to remove it
is an order affecting their substantial rights, and is therefore appeal-
able.
56. 6 Wn. App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (1972). See note 27 supra.
57. 7 Wn. App. 219, 499 P.2d 92 (1972). See note 27 supra.
58. In both cases the property interest was use and possession of an automobile.
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.12.130(2) (1959).
60. Id. § 7.12.130(l).
61. Smith, Sniadach and Summary Procedures: The Constitution Comes to the
Marketplace, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 300, 333-34 (1972). See also Osmund v. Spence, 327 F.
Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 405 U.S. 971 (1972), where a
three judge court declared unconstitutional state statutes and court rules which per-
mitted entry of judgments by confession upon warrant of attorney without prior notice
and a hearing, concluding that:
We have no doubt that a significant property interest is involved . . . because the
lien resulting from the entry of judgment, while not completely depriving the
debtor from the use of his property, would nevertheless seriously restrict his ability
to sell it or use it for collateral.
327 F. Supp. at 1356. Cf. Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154. 159
(Fla. Ct. App. 1970).
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.320 (1959).
63. 24 Wash. 405, 407, 64 P. 522, 523 (1901).
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Pursuant to statute, a lis pendens is filed at the commencement of a
lawsuit affecting title to real estate and is recorded without prior no-
tice and opportunity for a hearing. Since it is as much a deprivation of
a significant property interest as is a prejudgment attachment of prop-
erty, it, too, may be unconstitutional on due process grounds.
Is the deprivation which occurs at the time of the recording of the
notice of sale in a private deed of trust foreclosure directly analagous
to the deprivation caused by a prejudgment attachment or the re-
cording of a lis pendens?64 Unlike many attachment or lis pendens situ-
ations in which a bona fide purchaser of real property will have no
notice of a third party's claim to the property until the documents are
recorded, a potential purchaser of a borrower's interest under a deed
of trust agreement always will have record notice that the lender
claims an interest in the land.65 But record notice of the existence of a
mortgage does not make land inalienable. The potential purchaser
may wish to assume the mortgage and pay the borrower the amount
of his equity in the land, or the purchaser may leave the details of
paying off the outstanding mortgage to the borrower. In contrast, the
potential purchaser who has record notice of an impending trustee's
sale would be far less likely to acquire the borrower's equity, particu-
larly if it was only a marginal amount.66 The purchaser may decide
that the borrower's equity does not exceed the amount of the default
plus the added trustee's costs, 67 or the purchaser may choose to wait
and either purchase the property directly at the trustee's sale68 or from
the lender after the sale at less than fair market value.
To understand the similarities between a prejudgment attachment
or a lis pendens and the recording of the notice of sale more clearly,
consider the following. Assume that a mortgagee forecloses on prop-
erty held subject to the mortgage and that a lis pendens is filed. Even
64. The Gose article concluded that the two are directly analogous. "Apparently this
notice provison is similar to lis pendens cutting off all subsequent lienors, encum-
brances, or grantees." 41 WASH. L. REV. at 98.
65. The deed of trust will be recorded as a mortgage. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.020
(Supp. 1972).
66. As it often takes a number of years to obtain a substantial equity in land, the
majority of all homeowners probably have only marginal equity.
67. The trustee's costs are discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes 71-76
infra.
68. Given the quality of title conveyed at the trustee's sale, this would be an attrac-
tive alternative.
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though the mortgagee has an interest in the land, the filing of the lis
pendens is as much a deprivation of property as is a lis pendens filed
by a third party with no prior record interest in the land.6 9 The mort-
gagee's interest in the property is limited to a lien in the amount of the
mortgage; beyond this lien the mortgagee may not interfere with the
mortgagor's interests, specifically the alienability of the property. By
the same analysis, the lender's interest in property secured by a deed
of trust is limited to a lien in the amount of the obligation; if the re-
cording of the notice of sale restricts the alienability of the property, as
we assert that it does,70 then the lender (through the trustee) is de-
priving the borrower of a significant property interest.
Thus, in practice, the recording of the notice of sale substantially
reduces the alienability of the borrower's interest in the land. We be-
lieve that this is not a de minimis deprivation of property.
(b) Amount of equity. Notwithstanding the loss of alienability re-
sulting from the borrower's inability to receive the fair market value
of his interest in the land, the recording of the notice of sale can have
the direct effect of substantially reducing the amount of the borrow-
er's equity in the land. This occurs for a simple reason: most of the
eventual costs of the private foreclosure sale are added to the amount
of the borrower's default at this initial stage of the procedure. The
Washington Deed of Trust Act provides that to cure a default after the
recording of the notice of sale, the borrower must pay the amount of
the principal and interest (without acceleration of the outstanding bal-
ance) then owing plus "the costs of the trustee incurred and the trus-
tee's fee accrued, which accrued fee shall not exceed fifty dollars. 71
The fifty-dollar limit apparently applies only to the trustee's fee, not to
the other costs incurred.
What are these other costs? First, the cost of a title search will be
included, since R.C.W. § 61.24.04072 requires that notice of the trus-
69. By analogy, the Fuentes majority apparently found no difference between a pre-judgment replevin action brought by a secured or an unsecured creditor. Disregarding
the creditor's interest in the disputed property, the Court stated in a footnote, "Proce-
dural due process is not intended to .. . accommodate all possible interests: it is in-
tended to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are about to
be taken." 407 U.S. at 90 n.22. See also the discussion in the text accompanying notes
175-76 infra.
70. See also note 64 supra.
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.090 (Supp. 1972).
72. Id. § 61.24.040.
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tee's sale be sent to every person claiming an interest or lien of record
in the land at least 120 days before the sale. Because the trustee will
try to set the date of sale as early as possible to minimize the lender's
loss, the title search may occur immediately upon receipt of a notice
of default. Second, the trustee's costs at this point include the re-
cording fee(s) and the cost of mailing notice to all interested parties.
Third, and most important, the trustee's costs often include reasonable
attorneys' fees.73 While the statute makes no explicit mention of what
the trustee's costs at this point in time can include, the practice is to
include attorneys' fees. 74 Moreover, some attorneys assert that the
amount of the attorney's fee is the same regardless of whether the trus-
tee's sale occurs or not.7 5 The amount of the fee can be $200 or more.
These three "costs incurred" together with the statutory trustee's fee of
$50 often total $350 or more. All of these costs accrue contempora-
neously with the recording of the notice of sale and can have a dev-
73. Id. The opinion of the local bar is that a non-attorney trustee who does not re-
tain an attorney at the time of the recording of the notice of sale is engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law. Letter from Harry C. Wilson, Chairman, Unauthorized
Practice of Law Comm., to Board of Governors, Washington State Bar Ass'n, April 1,
1966, on file with the Washington Law Review.
The trustee may require the assistance of an attorney to interpret the results of the
title search and to determine who must be sent the statutorily required notice. An at-
torney also may be necessary to determine whether to proceed with a private or a judi-
cial foreclosure proceeding.
74. See Circular Letter No. 232 from Dep't of Housing and Urban Development
[HUD], Seattle Area Office, to Employees and Persons Doing Business with
HUD-FHA. Feb. 4, 1972; Circular Letter No. 221 from HUD, Seattle Area Office, to
Employees and Persons Doing Business with FHA, June 3, 1971, both on file with the
Washington Law Review.
There appears to be a trend developing by attorneys charging unreasonably high
fees for processing delinquent mortgages. Mortgagees [sic] have been charged
up to $200 by attorneys in addition to costs for ordering a title search and send-
ing routine letters.
It appears they are charging fees as if each mortgage will be foreclosed.
Id.
75. Id.
One direct cause of mortgagors losing their property is attorney's fees. As soon
as a mortgagee refers a mortgage to an attorney for foreclosure, fees are initiated.
When a mortgagor makes an effort to contact the mortgagee at this point, their
standard answer is, "It's out of our hands, you'll have to talk to our attorney."
Upon contacting the attorney, the mortgagor is advised that all payments must be
made including attorney fees before the mortgage will be reinstated. Often a mort-
gagor will have raised sufficient funds to make the required mortgage payments but
cannot pay the attorney fees which, by this time, even though the only work in-
volved is preparing several process forms and ordering a title search, will be any-
where from $ 100 to $250.
HUD, Circular Letter No. 221 supra note 74.
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astating effect on the borrower's ability to cure the default.76 In effect,
any increase in the amount necessary to cure the default correspond-
ingly decreases the borrower's equity in the property. Hence, the re-
cording of the notice of sale at the commencement of the foreclosure
process substantially reduces the borrower's equity in the property.
We believe that this is not a de minimis deprivation.
To summarize this discussion, the private foreclosure of a deed of
trust in Washington results in three deprivations of property: (1) the
taking of all of the borrower's interest in the property without full
compensation at the time of the trustee's sale; (2) a substantial reduc-
tion of the alienability of the borrower's interest at the time of re-
cording the notice of sale; and (3) a substantial reduction of the bor-
rower's equity in the land at the time of the recording of the notice of
sale.
3. Does the Deprivation of Property Involve State Action?
Not every deprivation of property violates due process, for the four-
teenth amendment's directive, "nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law ... ,, has been
interpreted over the years to mean that only deprivations which in-
volve "state action" violate due process. The recent Supreme Court
procedural due process cases all involved obvious state action: a court
clerk issued a prejudgment writ of garnishment pursuant to a state
statute,7 8 a state agency terminated welfare payments pending a hear-
ing,79 a local police officer posted a restriction of sales of liquor pur-
76. An example will illustrate the potential effect of these additional costs. Assume
that a borrower defaults on his January mortgage payment of $150. The lender will typi-
cally refuse to accept the February payment of$ 150 unless it is accompanied by the de-
linquent January payment ($300 total). Assuming that the borrower saves the unac-
cepted payments, the position of the parties in early April, when the lender sends the
trustee a notice of default, will be as follows. The borrower will be four months in de-
fault ($600), but will have saved up three months' payments ($450), leaving a net default
of only one month ($150). On receiving the notice of default, the trustee will almost
immediately incur the costs described in the text. The total amount needed to cure the
default will jump from $600 (four months' payments) to $950 or more. The net amount
needed to cure the default will jump from $150 (one month's payment) to $500 or more.
an amount which may prohibit cure.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
78. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
79. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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suant to a state excessive drinking statute,8 0 court officials denied ac-
cess to the state's machinery for dissolving a marriage,8' a state offi-
cial suspended a state-issued driver's license,8 2 state officials deprived
the father of illegitimate children of the custody of his children after
the mother's death,8 3 and a court clerk issued a prejudgment writ of
replevin which was levied by a local deputy sheriff.8 4 However, the
concept of state action can be subjected to very subtle refinements.8 5 For
our purposes, a private trustee's sale pursuant to the Washington Deed
of Trust Act seems to involve sufficient state action to violate the due
process clause.86 Although the trustee's power of sale is expressly pro-
vided for in the trust deed agreement and no state official directly re-
views the procedure at any stage of the process, the Washington Deed
of Trust Act represents such a profound change from the pre-existing
Washington law,87 has such a substantial impact on the nature of the
"private" foreclosure and the rights of the parties thereto, and relies so
heavily upon actions by state officials that the necessary state action
appears to be present.
Upon first impression, the state action question presented in a deed
of trust foreclosure in Washington appears to be very similar to the
state action question posed by a "self-help" repossession under Uni-
form Commercial Code section 9-503.88 This latter issue has been the
80. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
81. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
82. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
83. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
84. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
85. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (issuance of state
liquor licenses to racially discriminatory private clubs is not sufficient state action to
violate the fourteenth amendment); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (a racially
discriminatory amendment to the California State Constitution which prohibited the
state from denying the right of any person to decline to sell or rent real property to any
person constituted sufficient state action to violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
86. For a more general discussion of state action and the power of sale, see Com-
ment, Power of Sale After Fuentes, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 206, 217-20 (1972).
87. See note 9 supra.
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-503 (Supp. 1972) states:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take posses-
sion of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by
action.
The precise question is whether a self-help repossession involves sufficient state action to
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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subject of frenzied litigation. 89 A brief examination of the first two
major federal district court decisions on the question reveals the argu-
ments involved.
In Adams v. Egley,90 a California federal district court held that a
UCC self-help repossession involved sufficient state action to be
within the due process clause and found section 9-503 to be unconstitu-
tional for failing to provide notice and a hearing to the debtor before
the repossession occurred. The Adams court reasoned that California
state law, specifically sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the California
Commercial Code, encouraged private repossessions, citing Reitman
v. Mulkey.91 While the UCC repossession provisions were included in
the actual contract, the Adams court reasoned that the sellers were
induced to include the provisions because of the state statutes.
In Oler v. Bank of America,92 another federal district court in Cal-
ifornia reached the opposite conclusion. The Oiler court found no
state action in self-help repossessions because the creditor is not a
governmental agency, no government official assists the creditor in the
repossession, the act of repossession is not compelled, and the au-
thority to repossess is based upon a contractual right which had been
judicially approved prior to the adoption of the California Commer-
cial Code. The Oler court met Adams v. Egley head-on and simply
refused to be persuaded, distinguishing the Reitman holding as being
limited to a compelling factual situation involving racial discrimina-
tion.
If the Adams approach prevails, a private deed of trust foreclosure
in Washington undoubtedly is "state action," for the very purpose of
89. With respect to federal district courts, compare Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1484, 9th Cir., 1972 (sufficient state ac-
tion, § 9-503 is unconstitutional), and Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., CCH SECURED
TRANSACTIONS GUIDE, 52,070 (D. Vt. 1972) (sufficient state action, § 9-503
unconstitutional) with Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
appeal docketed, No. 72-1888, 9th Cir., 1972 (no state action, no jurisdiction to decide
constitutionality); Greene v. First Nat'l Exchange Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va.
1972) (passive state action only which does not violate the due process clause); Kirksey
v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972) (no state action, no violation of due
process); Pease v. Havelock National Bank, CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE
52,095 (D. Neb. 1972) (no state action, no jurisdiction to decide constitutionality); and
Colvin v. Avco Financial Services, 1973 CCH POVERTY LAw REPORTER 16,750 (D.
Utah 1973) (no state action, no jurisdiction to decide constitutionality.)
90. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1484, 9th Cir..
1972.
91. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See note 85 supra.
92. 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1888. 9th Cir.. 1972.
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the Act was to enable lenders to include a power of sale in the under-
lying real property obligation. Yet even if the more restrictive Oiler
analysis prevails, there nevertheless may be sufficient state action in a
deed of trust foreclosure to violate due process because a Washington
deed of trust foreclosure is distinguishable from a self-help reposses-
sion. We suggest three significant differences: (1) as the power of sale
in real property transactions was not a judicially approved contractual
right in Washington, 93 the 1965 Act created the entire foreclosure
procedure and strictly governs the rights and duties of the parties in-
volved; (2) the Washington Act's foreclosure mechanism requires ac-
tions, albeit ministerial ones, by state officials which directly result in
a deprivation of property-a master form deed of trust is on record in
each county, each individual trust deed is recorded, and most impor-
tant, the notice of trustee's sale must be recorded in the appropriate
county 120 days before the sale;9 4 and (3) the Act's enforcement pro-
vision is dependent upon the use of the unlawful detainer statute95 and
can result in the eviction of the borrower by a local deputy sheriff.
The trustee under a deed of trust instrument in Washington is a
creature of statutory origin. While it may be stretching the point to
call the trustee a state official, he is the only person who is authorized
to sell the property at a private sale.96 The trustee derives his power
from the Washington Act, which spells out who may be trustee97 and
details exactly what the trustee must do to exercise the power of sale.9 8
As there was no pre-existing private power of sale in real estate trans-
actions in Washington, -' 9 the Washington Act completely governs the
rights of the parties prior to and after the trustee's sale, the interest
conveyed by the sale, and even the time which must elapse after de-
fault before the sale can occur. 100
93. See note 9 supra.
94. See note 3 supra; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 61.24.020, .040 (Supp. 1972).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.060 (Supp. 1972). The unlawful detainer statute is
codified in WASH. REV. CODE ch. 59.12 (1959).
96. See the discussion of the trustee's role in Comment, Due Process Evolution-
Fuentes and the Deed of Trust, 26 Sw. L. 876, 886 (1972):
[T] he trustee's right to act at all is a statutory creation. . . . The trustee, though
not technically a state officer, is the only person authorized by the statute to sell the
property upon foreclosure. The foreclosure sale provision is wholly inoperative
without his legislatively condoned action.
97. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 61.24.010-.020 (Supp. 1972).
98. Id. §§ 61.24.030-.040.
99. See note 9 supra.
100. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 61.24 (Supp. 1972).
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In many ways there is as much state action in a Washington deed of
trust foreclosure as there is in either a prejudgment attachment or re-
plevin situation. In Fuentes and Lucas v. Stapp,'0' at the behest of a
private creditor and according to a state statute, a court clerk at an ex
parte proceeding issued a prejudgment writ, which was then presented
to a local deputy sheriff. Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff seized the
debtor's property. Similarly, in a deed of trust foreclosure, pursuant to
statute, a private creditor instructs the trustee to present a notice of
sale to the county auditor. When the county auditor records the notice
of sale, he is "seizing" the borrower's property just as plainly as the
sheriff above, for the loss of alienability of the property can have just
as devastating an effect as the seizure of household goods.102
Additionally, the deprivation which occurs after the trustee's sale
can directly parallel the deprivation in Fuentes or Lucas. The Wash-
ington Deed of Trust Act relies for its enforcement mechanism upon
the unlawful detainer statute.' 03 Generally, at the completion of the
unlawful detainer proceeding, a writ of restitution or a writ of assis-
tance is directed to the county sheriff to physically restore possession
to the purchaser at the trustee's sale. The borrower who is physically
evicted from property by a deputy sheriff surely suffers as directly by
state action as the debtor who loses property through prejudgment
replevin or attachment.
The ultimate question of whether a private deed of trust foreclosure
constitutes state action awaits future judicial determination. We be-
lieve that in Washington there appears to be sufficient state action in a
deed of trust foreclosure to violate due process.
4. The Deed of Trust Foreclosure: An Extraordinary Situation?
It is well established that in "extraordinary situations" there can be
a deprivation of property without prior notice and a hearing. These
situations usually involve cases in which an overriding public interest
warrants immediate action to protect members of the public. 10 4 The
101. 6 Wn. App. 971,497 P.2d 250 (1972), discussed in note 27 supra.
102. See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 44-76 supra.
103. See note 95 supra.
104. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (summary
seizure of property necessary to protect the public from misbranded drugs); North
American Cold Storage v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (summary seizure necessary to
protect the public from contaminated food).
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Fuentes court acknowledged that "(t)here are extraordinary situations
that justify postponing notice and a hearing."105 Observe that the effect
of an extraordinary situation is not to eliminate the need for notice
and a hearing but only to postpone it. Thus, this brief discussion may
be unnecessary since the Washington Deed of Trust Act does not
provide for a hearing, but merely acknowledges the obvious right of
the borrower to initiate court action to restrain the threatened sale,
which in constitutional terms is a woefully inadequate opportunity to
be heard.'0 6
Even assuming for the moment that the Act does provide an oppor-
tunity to be heard, a deed of trust foreclosure does not appear to
qualify as an extraordinary situation which would justify postponing
the notice and hearing. The latest procedural due process case,
Fuentes v. Shevin,'0 7 provides a three-part test to determine if an
extraordinary situation exists: (1) is the seizure or deprivation necessary
to secure an important governmental or general public interest? (2) is
there a need for very prompt action? and (3) is there strict state con-
trol by an official acting under the standards of a narrowly drawn
statute to ensure that the seizure or deprivation is necessary and justi-
fiable in the particular instance?' 08 While it is not clear whether all
three of these questions must be answered in the affirmative for an
extraordinary situation to exist, it is certain that at least one question
must be answered affirmatively.' 09
A deed of trust foreclosure appears to fail all three tests. Answering
the questions in reverse order, there is obviously no strict control by a
state official at any point in a typical deed of trust foreclosure. Neither
would there seem to b6 any pressing need for very prompt action: real
property, unlike personalty, cannot be absconded with by the debtor.
The immediate recording of the notice of sale with its attendant dep-
rivation of the borrower's property interest does not appear to be
compelled; there is no reason why the recording cannot occur as little
as thirty days before the sale. l" 0 Finally, it is questionable whether a
105. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90, citing Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379.
106. This conclusion is reached in the text accompanying notes 145-60 infra.
107. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
108. Id. at 91-92.
109. For an extended discussi6n of the Fuentes test, see 48 WASH. L. REv. 646,
655-60 (1973).
110. See note 195 infra.
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lender who forecloses on a deed of trust is acting to secure an impor-
tant governmental or general public interest; there seems to be
nothing more than private gain at stake."' Moreover, when one ex-
amines the precise question of whether there is an important govern-
mental interest in recording the notice of sale at the very beginning of
the foreclosure procedure, thereby depriving the borrower of the al-
ienability of his interest and substantially reducing his equity in the
land by increasing the amount necessary for cure,112 while at the same
time providing no recognizable benefit to the lender, 113 the question
answers itself. Thus a deed of trust foreclosure is not an extraordinary
situation which would justify even postponing a notice and hearing.
5. Can Due Process Rights Be Contractually Waived in a Deed of
Trust Instrument?
The foregoing discussion establishes that a private deed of trust fore-
closure deprives a borrower of a significant property interest by state
action in a non-extraordinary situation. Accordingly, the borrower has
a constitutional right to the due process protections of notice and a
hearing prior to the deprivation unless there has been a valid waiver
of that right. To make this determination, one must consider whether
there can be a contractual waiver of the borrower's due process pro-
tections in a deed of trust instrument. Although a recent Supreme
Court decision, Overmyer v. Frick,114 establishes that due process
rights can be contractually waived, the standard applied in Overmyer
is difficult to meet. Such a waiver must be "voluntarily, intelligently,
and knowingly" made.' 15 As the Fuentes Court points out:t 1 6
The contract in Overmyer was negotiated between two corporations;
the waiver provision was specifically bargained for and drafted by
their lawyers in the process of these negotiations. . . . [I] t was "not a
case of unequal bargaining power or overreaching. The Over-
myer-Frick agreement, from the start, was not a contract of adhesion."
I 11. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 92 (when secured creditors utilize state replevin stat-
utes to summarily seize a debtor's property, "no more than private gain is directly at
stake.").
112. See the text accompanying notes 44-76 supra.
113. See the text immediately following note 180 infra.
114. 405 U.S. 174(1972).
115. Id. at 187. See generally the discussion of waiver in Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 94-96.
116. Id. at 95.
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[405 U.S. at 186] Both parties were "aware of the significance" of the
waiver provision. [Id.] ....
The Court in Overmyer observed that "where the contract is one of
adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and
where the debtor receives nothing for the [waiver] provision, other
legal consequences may ensue." [id. at 188.]
Thus whether the borrower's due process rights can be waived in the
deed of trust instrument depends on the facts of each case. 117 Prob-
ably very few fact situations will be found where the waiver provision
was bargained for and drafted (with or without lawyers) in the process
of negotiation between parties of equal bargaining power, or where
both parties were aware of the significance of the waiver provision. It
seems likely that a court usually will find either a contract of adhe-
sion, a great disparity in bargaining power, or a situation in which the
borrower received no consideration for the waiver provision.
The Washington Supreme Court recently has shown marked reluct-
ance to enforce waivers of substantial contractual, as distinguished
from constitutional, rights. Speaking of the validity of a waiver of an
implied warranty of merchantability, the Washington court stated in
Berg v. Stromme:"8 "Waivers of such warranties, being disfavored in
law, are ineffectual unless explicitly negotiated between buyer and
seller and set forth with particularity showing the particular qualities
and characteristics of fitness which are being waived." It can be ex-
pected that a standard of at least this stringence will be applied to an
attempted waiver of a constitutional right.
There are very few appellate cases dealing with a waiver of due
process rights in a deed of trust. In MCA, Inc. v. Universal Diversified
Enterprises Corp.,"9 a California appellate court faced with a bor-
rower who had executed a trust deed as security on a promissory note of
$715,000, who admitted that there was no disparity of bargaining
117. A recent comment concluded:
Apparently the [Fntentes] Court has formulated a new test for an effective
contractual waiver of due process. To insure validity, such a waiver (I) must
appear in type commensurate in size with the type or print in the body of the
contract, (2) must be actually bargained for on a status of equal and full under-
standing of its meaning, and (3) must be accompanied by an explanation of
its impact or must specifically describe what is in fact being waived.
Comment, Due Process Evolttio--Fuentes and the Deed of Trust, 26 Sw. LJ. 876,
883 (1972).
118. 79 Wn. 2d 184, 196,484 P.2d 380,386 (1971).
119. 27 Cal. App. 3d 173, 103 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1972).
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power, and who did not contend that it received nothing in exchange
for agreeing to a nonjudicial sale in event of default, refused to find a
contract of adhesion merely because the waiver provision was con-
tained in a form document.1 20 The MCA court upheld the waiver.
A 1970 federal district court decision, Young v. Ridley,' 2' did not
hesitate to find and approve a waiver in a real property power of sale
situation. The Young court found that the implicit premise of the Dis-
trict of Columbia deed of trust statute "is that an owner who has will-
ingly given a power of sale has waived judicial foreclosure."'' 22 The
Young opinion relied upon two very old Supreme Court decisions 2 3
and two moderately recent state cases,' 24 all pre-Sniadach, to uphold
the statute in question.
Young v. Ridley, one of the first post-Sniadach procedural due
process cases, gave Sniadach a very limited reading, finding no depri-
vation of a constitutionally protected property interest.1 25 In deter-
mining the validity of the waiver, the court applied the principles of
general contract law, not the principles governing waiver of a consti-
tutional right.' 26 Because of these two major errors, the case would
seem to be of questionable precedential value.
120. 103 Cal. Rptr. at 525.
121. 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970).
122. Id. at 1312.
123. Scott v. Paisley, 271 U.S. 632 (1926); Bell Silver & Copper Mining Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 156 U.S. 470 (1895).
124. Ross v. Belcher, 79 Idaho 473, 321 P.2d 210 (1958): Great Falls Nat'l Bank v.
McCormick, 448 P.2d 991 (Mont. 1968). Both cases were pre-Sniaduch and pre-
Fuentes, and there was no discussion of the meaningful time and meaningful manner
requirement.
125. Plaintiff in Young alleged that a deprivation of property occurred at the
commencement of the foreclosure mechanism, an argument very similar to that ad-
vanced in the text accompanying notes 44-76 supra. The Young court held: "Mere insti-
tution of the foreclosure mechanism in no way affects a debtor's use of his property.-
309 F. Supp. at 1312.
This result is easily explained. First, the Young court gave Sniadach a very limited
reading; see Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 72-73 n.5. Fuentes has established that Sniadach is to
be given a broad reading, id. at 80-84, 88-90. Second, and more important, the statuto-
rily required notice thirty days prior to the private sale was not recorded, unlike Wash-
ington's procedure. (While a copy of the notice was to be sent to the Commissioner of
the District of Columbia, the purpose of that notice was to enable the D.C. officials to
"investigate the proposed foreclosure to protect against . . . abuses ...... 309 F.
Supp. at 13 11.) Hence, the alienability of the borrower's interest was not affected at the
commencement of the foreclosure procedure.
126. The Young court anticipated the change in the waiver standard. "[W] hether
the validity of an agreement to waive judicial foreclosure, i.e. to grant a power of sale,
should be tested by more stringent standards than those of general contract law remains
for decision." Id. at 1313.
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Although a valid contractual waiver of due process rights is possi-
ble, there appears to be no shortcut to a determination of whether the
waiver was voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made. We suggest
that most residential deed of trust instruments will fail to meet this
standard. 127 Finally, even if there can be a valid waiver of the right to
a hearing in a deed of trust instrument, due process requires that the
statutory framework must meaningfully provide for that right. In the
words of Justice Harlan, 128 "That the hearing required by due pro-
cess is subject to waiver . . . does not affect its root requirement
that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest."
C. Does the Washington Deed of Trust Act Comply with Due
Process Requirements?
The foregoing discussion has established that procedural due
process applies to deed of trust foreclosures. The recording of the no-
tice of sale and the trustee's sale appear to be a deprivation of prop-
erty within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The deprivation is the result of state action, it does not
occur in an exceptional situation, and there will seldom be a valid
waiver of the procedural due process rights involved. Given this re-
sult, it is necessary to determine whether the Washington Deed of
Trust Act complies with due process requirements. This determination
is a simple one--does the Act provide for notice and an opportunity
to be heard prior to a deprivation of property?
1. Notice
At present, the Washington Act requires that at least 120 days prior
to the trustee's sale, notice of that sale is to be (1) recorded with the
county auditor; (2) mailed by first class and by certified mail, return
127. Moreover, if the validiiy of any deed of trust foreclosure occurring under the
present statute (without prior notice and a hearing) is subject to a later constitutional
attack on the ground of no valid waiver of the borrower's due process rights, the quality
of the title acquired by the purchaser at the trustee's sale will suffer. It is possible that
title insurers would refuse to insure the purchaser's title or that the cost of the title in-
surance would skyrocket.
128. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378-79 (Court's italics).
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receipt requested, to the borrower and all other parties claiming an
interest in the land; and (3) posted in a conspicuous place on the prop-
erty or else served as any summons is served upon any occupant of the
real property involved. 129 In addition, during the four weeks pre-
ceding the time of sale, a copy of the notice is to be published in a
legal newspaper in the county where the property is located.1 30 The
notice must contain: (1) the names of the borrower (grantor), trustee
(grantee), and lender (beneficiary); (2) a description of the land; (3)
the default for which foreclosure is made; (4) the date by which the
default must be cured in order to cause a discontinuance of sale; (5)
the amount in arrears if a default is for failure to make payment; (6)
the sum owing on the obligation secured by the deed of trust; and (7)
the time and place of sale.' 3' Although it does not inform him of the
exact amount necessary to cure the default,' 32 it is certain that the stat-
utory notice adequately informs the borrower of the impending trus-
tee's sale.
But in constitutional terms, is notice of impending doom enough to
satisfy due process requirements? The constitutional raison d'Otre for
notice is to alert a person of an opportunity to be heard. The early
Supreme Court case of Baldwin v. Hale 33 concisely stated the rela-
tionship between notice and a hearing: "Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy
that right they must first be notified."' 3 4 Statutory notice is constitu-
tionally inadequate if it does not notify the recipient of an opportunity
to be heard.135 Since the statutory notice contains no mention of any
potential opportunity to be heard, under this analysis the Washington
129. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.040(1) (Supp. 1972).
130. Id. § 61.24.040(3).
13 1. Id. § 61.24.040(2).
132. The statutorily required notice does not require a total figure of the sum
needed to discontinue the sale, but merely the total amount in arrears at the time of the
notice. Yet the statute provides that after the recording of the notice of sale, the amount
needed to cure the default includes not only the amount in arrears on the underlying
obligation (which cannot be accelerated), but also the trustee's costs. (See note 71 and
accompanying text.) The result is that if on receipt of the required notice the borrower
promptly confronts the lender with the amount of arrears listed in the notice, the offer of
payment often will be refused because it does not include an additional amount for the
trustee's costs. Thus, the burden is on the borrower to contact the trustee and ask for a
statement of the exact amount necessary to cure the default.
133. 68 U.S. 223 (1863).
134. Id. at 233.
135. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68: Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 337 U.S. 306, 314(1950).
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Deed of Trust Act would not appear to meet the constitutional re-
quirements for notice.
2. Opportunity to be Heard
The Washington Deed of Trust Act does not provide for an auto-
matic hearing prior to either the recording of the notice of sale or the
trustee's sale. The only conceivable opportunities to be heard under
the Act are (1) the borrower's opportunity to bring an action to re-
strain the trustee's sale, 136 and (2) the borrower's opportunity to de-
fend himself in an eviction proceeding brought after the sale occurs. 137
Does either of these two "opportunities" equal the constitutionally
required opportunity to be heard?
The recent procedural due process cases have frequently discussed
the required opportunity for a hearing. "The fundamental requisite of
due process is the opportunity to be heard.' 138 It must be granted "at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'1 39 Though subject to
waiver and variable in form, the opportunity to be heard must be pro-
vided before a deprivation of property occurs. 140 "Due process re-
quires that there be an opportunity to present every available de-
fense.' 14 ' The right to a hearing is not dependent upon a showing that
there is a valid defense which can be raised, 142 nor may it be denied
136. "Nothing contained in this chapter shall prejudice the right of the grantor
[borrower] or his successor in interest to restrain, on any proper ground, a threatened
sale by the trustee under a deed of trust." WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.130 (Supp.
1972).
137. The Act specifically authorizes the purchaser at the trustee's sale to bring a
summary unlawful detainer action against the borrower twenty days after the trustee's
sale. Id. § 61.24.060. The unlawful detainer statute is codified in WASH. REV. CODE ch.
59.12 (1959).
138. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
139. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
140. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378-79 (Court's italics). A hearing after the deprivation is
constitutionally inadequate because even though damages can be awarded for a
wrongful deprivation,
no later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking
that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already occurred. "This
Court has not.., embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it
can be undone ......
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82, quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
141. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972), quoting American Sur. Co. v. Bald-
win, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932).
142. "To one who protests against the taking of his property without due process of
law, it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process would have led to the
same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits." Fuentes, 407 U.S. at
87, quoting Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915).
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because of the cost or inconvenience involved. 143 Nevertheless, it is
only an opportunity for a hearing: "Of course, no hearing need be
held unless the defendant, having received notice of his opportunity,
takes advantage of it.'' t44
(a) The opportunity to bring a court action to restrain the sale. The
mere opportunity to bring a court action to restrain a deprivation of
property does not appear to constitute an "opportunity to be heard"
within the meaning of the procedural due process cases.' 45 In the con-
text of a typical deed of trust foreclosure, the opportunity to com-
mence a lawsuit to restrain the threatened sale would seem more illusory
than meaningful. Since almost by definition a defaulting purchaser has
financial problems, the costs involved in instituting suit would be
prohibitive. 146
At the outset, it should be observed that notice of the opportunity
to restrain the trustee's sale is given to the borrower after the re-
cording of the notice of sale. As a deprivation occurs at the time of the
recording of the notice of sale, 147 this opportunity fails the "mean-
ingful time" test. To provide an opportunity to be heard before a dep-
rivation occurs, it would be necessary to provide notice to the bor-
rower that the recording of the notice of sale is imminent, in order
that the recording could be restrained.
At a more basic level, it would not appear that the borrower's op-
portunity to initiate a lawsuit to restrain the trustee's sale constitutes
the required opportunity to be heard. The United States Supreme
Court was faced with an analogous argument in Stanley v. Illinois,148
which held that a father has a significant interest, property or other-
143. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90 n.22.
144. Id. at 93 n.29.
145. For a contrary conclusion, see Strutt v. Ontario Savings & Loan Ass'n, 28 Cal.
App. 3d 866, 105 Cal. Rptr. 395, 403 (1972) (dictum: California's deed of trust statute is
constitutional because the borrower is given ninety days in which to refinance the prop-
erty or "institute an action to enjoin the sale and thereby obtain the judicial hearing con-
templated by [Sniadach and Fuentes]."). See also note 163 and accompanying text
infra.
146. Such costs include attorneys' fees and court costs, and if the litigation will not
be completed before the scheduled date of the trustee's sale, the cost of the bond neces-
sary for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief (which would equal at least the ar-
rearages plus the current payments). See WASH. SUPER. CT. (Cxv.) R. 65(c) and WASH.
REV. CODE § 7.40.080 (1959). Two recent Washington cases have held that a trial court
cannot disregard this bond requirement. Irwin v. Estes, 77 Wn. 2d 285, 461 P.2d 875
(1969); Evar, Inc. v. Kurbitz, 77 Wn. 2d 948, 468 P.2d 677 (1970).
147. See notes 44-76 and accompanying text supra.
148. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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wise, in the custody of his illegitimate children after the mother's
death. In striking down an Illinois procedure which automatically
made the children wards of the state and placed them in foster homes
without provision for a hearing to determine the fitness of the father
for custody purposes, the Court rejected the argument that no depri-
vation occurred because of the father's later opportunity to institute
adoption or guardianship proceedings to regain custody of the
children. Beyond holding that an opportunity for a hearing after the
deprivation (loss of custody) is constitutionally inadequate with the
classic line, "This Court has not, however, embraced the general prop-
osition that a wrong may be done if it can later be undone,"'1 49 the
Stanley Court went on to discuss the probable futility of the later
adoption or guardianship proceedings. In the course of this analysis,
Justice White, the author of the majority opinion, stated: "Passing the
obvious issue whether it would be futile or burdensome for an unmar-
ried father-without funds and already presumed unfit-to petition
for custody, this suggestion [fails for other reasons] ."150 While this is
mere dictum, the common sense approach of the Stanley Court-is
this opportunity futile or burdensome?-seems directly applicable to
a deed of trust foreclosure. Measured under this standard, the borrow-
er's opportunity to initiate a court action to restrain the trustee's sale,
which comes after a deprivation (the recording of the notice of sale),
certainly would seem burdensome.
Because of the unavoidable costs, the opportunity to commence a
court action to restrain the sale always will fail to pass the "mean-
ingful time" test. The applicable rule is simple: an opportunity to be
heard must be provided before a deprivation occurs. But in constitu-
tional terms, the costs of litigation are themselves a "deprivation"!' 51
Hence, so long as it costs money to initiate a lawsuit, any "opportunity
to be heard" which results from the initiation of a lawsuit cannot
come before a deprivation occurs.
In Fuentes v. Shevin,'52 the Supreme Court examined very similar
deprivations. The defendant creditors in Fuentes argued that a sum-
149. Id. at 647.
150. Id. at 648.
151. The deprivation is the loss of use and possession of the money nec-
essary to institute the court action. See note 146 supra.
152. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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mary seizure of property pursuant to a prejudgment writ of replevin
did not cause a deprivation because the debtors could quickly recover
possession of the replevied property by posting a bond; the Court held
that the bond procedure merely altered the type of deprivation. In-
stead of being deprived of use and possession of the goods pending the
final hearing on the merits, the debtors were deprived of the use and
possession of the money necessary to post the bond. 53 Since both of
these deprivations occurred without prior notice and a hearing, they
were equally unacceptable. In the same discussion, the Fuentes Court
carefully distinguished between the replevin bond situation and the
bond requirement upheld in Lindsey v. Normet.154 The Lindsey Court
upheld an Oregon procedure which required a tenant to post a bond
in order to obtain a continuance of an eviction proceeding brought
pursuant to an unlawful detainer statute. 155 But as the Fuentes Court
carefully pointed out, "the tenant did not have to post security in
order to remain in possession before a hearing; rather, he had to post
a security only in order to obtain a continuance of the hearing."'156
In a deed of trust foreclosure, in order to remain in possession until
a hearing the borrower does have to furnish the money necessary for
court costs, attorneys' fees and any necessary bond. Indeed, the bor-
rower must initiate a court action and incur the concomitant ex-
penses to even obtain a hearing-any hearing. The Fuentes analysis
seems to confirm that the opportunity to initiate court action to re-
strain the impending trustee's sale is not the equivalent of the constitu-
tionally required opportunity to be heard before a deprivation of
property occurs. 157
153. Id. at 85.
154. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
155. Id. at 65.
156. 407 U.S. at 85 n.15 (Court's italics).
157. On first reading, language in Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65-68, seems to suggest a
contrary conclusion. In rejecting the contention that a tenant is denied due process of
law by the extremely limited scope of an expedited unlawful detainer hearing, Justice
White, speaking for the majority, stated: "The tenant is not foreclosed from instituting
his own action against the landlord and litigating his right to damages or other relief
in that action." Id. at 66. On closer reading, however, Lindsey does not support the
contention that an opportunity to initiate a court proceeding equals a constitutionally
required opportunity to be heard, for the Court found that the plaintiff tenants had
no protected property interest which entitled them to continued possession of the
leased premises without paying rent. The Lindsey Court implicity assumed that a
tenant's significant property interest-the right to use and possession of leased premises
-is contingent upon payment of the rent; absent such payment, the landlord is
immediately entitled to possession of the property. A delay in evicting a defaulting
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Other language in Fuentes also supports this conclusion. The
Fuentes Court faced a situation somewhat analogous to a deed of trust
foreclosure in determining the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
prejudgment replevin procedure. In contrast to the challenged Florida
replevin statute on which the opinion focused, the Pennsylvania pro-
cedure allowed a creditor to obtain an ex* parte writ of replevin
without also filing an underlying suit for repossession, 58 thus forcing
the debtor to initiate court action to contest the merits of the seizure.
In describing the Pennsylvania procedure, the Fuentes Court stated: 159
Unlike the Florida statute, however, the Pennsylvania law does not
require that there ever be opportunity for a hearing on the merits of
the conflicting claims to possession of the replevied property. . . . If
the party who loses property through replevin seizure is to get even a
post-seizure hearing, he must initiate a lawsuit himself.
Since the Fuentes Court explicitly recognized the debtor's ability to
initiate a lawsuit and yet stated that Pennsylvania law did not require
that there ever be an opportunity for a hearing on the merits, it would
appear to be the Fuentes Court's judgment that the option to initiate a
lawsuit does not equal the constitutionally required opportunity to be
heard.160
tenant results in a deprivation of the landlord's property interests. In upholding the
the constitutionality of the unlawful detainer statute, the Lindsey Court reasoned
that a procedure which allowed a landlord to file suit soon after nonpayment of rent,
which allowed the tenant to retain possession of the premises pending the expedited
hearing, and which limited the hearing to the simple issues of whether the rent has
been paid and whether the convenants of the lease have been honored, adequately
balanced the conflicting property interests of landlords and tenants. Moreover, the
Lindsey tenants were arguing "that they are denied due process of law because the
rental payments are not suspended while the alleged wrongdoings of the landlord are
litigated." Id. at 67. By the Lindsey Court's analysis, the tenants had no protected
property interest unless the rent had been paid, and hence the tenants were not en-
titled to the procedural due process protections of notice and a hearing-of any kind.
The Court's statement that the tenants were still able to litigate the landlord's cul-
pability in another proceeding merely reaffirmed the tenants' pre-existing rights.
In a deed of trust context, a borrower would appear to have two protected property
interests-the right to continued possession and use of the property (which may be
conditioned upon payment of the mortgage installments) and an equitable interest in
theland (which is not conditioned upon payment of the mortgage installments). See
the text accompanying notes 28-37 supra.
158. As a result, there was no later trial on the merits of the repossession. In the
usual case, the deprivation occurs as a result of a supplemental prejudgment seizure
procedure; a later hearing is provided on the merits of the underlying claim. See the
discussion of prejudgment seizure procedures in 48 WASH. L. REV. 646, 647-49 (1973).
159. 407 U.S. at 77-78 (Court's italics).
160. The facts of Fuentes are technically but not substantively distinguishable from
a deed of trust foreclosure. In a prejudgment replevin situation, a debtor was entitled to
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(b) The opportunity to defend in an unlawful detainer proceeding.
Does the borrower's opportunity to defend himself in an unlawful de-
tainer action brought by the purchaser after the trustee's sale satisfy
the requirements of due process? Again the answer is no.
First, the hearing in the eviction proceeding fails to meet the mean-
ingful time requirement. Two deprivations of property already have
occurred-the recording of the notice of sale and the trustee's sale it-
self. Second, the hearing in the eviction proceeding fails to meet the
meaningful manner requirement. It is well established in Washington
that a trial court's jurisdiction in an unlawful detainer action is of ex-
tremely limited scope. In Peoples National Bank v. Ostrander,n16 the
defendants in an unlawful detainer proceeding brought by the pur-
chaser after the trustee's sale attempted to allege as an affirmative de-
fense that the deed of trust was obtained by fraud because the plain-
tiffs had represented it as a mortgage. Further, in a cross-complaint,
the defendants sought to reform the deed of trust and have it declared
a mortgage. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike
both the cross-complaint and the affirmative defense. The Washington
Court of Appeals affirmed, stating:1 62
An unlawful detainer action does not contemplate a full-blown
trial . . .
"In an unlawful detainer action, the court sits as a special statutory
tribunal to summarily decide the issues authorized by statute and not
as a court of general jurisdiction with the power to hear and determine
other issues."
. . . Due to the trial court's limited jurisdiction in an action for
unlawful detainer, set-offs or counterclaims have not been al-
lowed. . . . However, affirmative equitable defenses have been per-
mitted.
a hearing on the merits after his property had been seized. In a deed of trust foreclosure.
the burden is on a borrower to initiate court action at a time when his property has not
yet been sold. Yet the difference is superficial; as was discussed earlier, a significant depri-
vation occurs at the time of the recording of the notice of sale, for the borrower may lose
the alienability and the equity necessary to raise the money needed to initiate a court
proceeding to restrain the sale. Like a prejudgment seizure pursuant to a writ of re-
plevin, the recording of the notice of sale comes without prior notice and opportunity
for a hearing.
161. 6Wn. App. 28,491 P.2d 1058 (1971).
162. Id. at 30-31, 491 P.2d at 1060, quoting Young v. Riley, 59 Wn. 2d 50. 52. 365
P.2d 769, 771 (1961).
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The Ostrander court went on to reach the highly questionable conclu-
sion that the defendants' affirmative defense of fraud was not an af-
firmative equitable defense, reasoning that the defendants were not
denied an adequate remedy at law by the Washington Deed of Trust
Act.163
Extended discussion of what constitutes an equitable defense would
seem unnecessary. The central point is clear-the borrower is re-
stricted significantly in the kinds of defenses he may raise because of
the limited scope of inquiry in an unlawful detainer proceeding. Ac-
cordingly, there is no opportunity to be heard "in a meaningful
manner."164
Thus the Washington Deed of Trust Act violates due process. To
satisfy constitutional standards, notice and an opportunity to be heard
must be accorded the borrower. Not only must this notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing occur before a deprivation of property occurs, but
it cannot be dependent upon the borrower's initiation of a court pro-
ceeding. A more detailed discussion of the form and timing of the
required hearing is presented later in this article. 165
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Stated simply, procedural due process provides a borrower with
two protections-notice and an opportunity to be heard before a dep-
rivation of property occurs. The overriding purpose of these protec-
tions, in the words of Justice Stewart, "is to protect [a person's] use
and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-to mini-
mize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property
. .. ."166 Surely the borrower would benefit from the addition of these
163. The Ostrander court's analysis of whether the Washington Deed of Trust Act
provided the defendant (borrower) with an adequate remedy at law is unsatisfactory.
After a cursory review of the circumstances surrounding the Act's adoption, a brief dis-
cussion of the Act's foreclosure mechanism, the borrower's right to act affirmatively to
restrain the sale, and the purchaser's express ability to bring an unlawful detainer action
to recover possession after the trustee's sale, the court stated: "To allow one to delay
asserting a defense until this late stage of the proceeding would be to defeat the spirit
and intent of the trust deed act." 6 Wn. App. at 32, 491 P.2d at 1060. If the quoted
statement is correct, the spirit and intent of the trust deed act, as well as the act itself,
violate due process of law.
164. But see the apparently contradictory language in Lindsey discussed in note 157
supra.
165. See the text accompanying notes 181-193 infra.
166. 407 U.S. at 81.
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protections to the private deed of trust foreclosure mechanism. Notice
and a hearing would allow the borrower to defend against an unfair or
mistaken claim of default 67 or to raise collateral defenses such as
fraudulent misrepresentation of the nature of a trust deed instrument
at the time of signing. t68 Notice of the upcoming hearing might spur
the borrower to cure the default early in the foreclosure procedure-
at a time when the fair market value of his property interest remains
unimpaired.1 69 The hearing itself would provide for automatic judicial
supervision of the trustee costs. As many borrowers receive no com-
pensation for their equity in property sold at a trustee's sale, the added
cost of the hearing would not reduce the amount a borrower actually
receives from the sale.170 Although borrowers inevitably would have to
bear the added costs of notice and a hearing, these costs often would
be distributed to most home buyers through slight increases in the cost
of federal mortgage insurance.'71 But would the addition of these sub-
167. For a discussion of the potential abuses of a private sale see Comment, Power
of Sale Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 206, 212 (1972):
Private sale is open to many abuses: for example, the mortgagee may not make a
good faith effort to realize any more than the amount of the debt, despite the fact
that the mortgagor has considerable equity in the property: the mortgagee may
foreclose through the power of sale for only a technical default which a court might
overlook; ... the mortgagee may sell the property after a default that is the product
of fraudulent or near-usurious terms in the mortgage contract, terms that a court
would refuse to enforce in ajudicial foreclosure.
168. See the discussion of Ostrander in notes 161-163 and accompanying text stupra.
169. As is suggested in the text accompanying note 183 infra, it seems necessary to
schedule the required hearing before the recording of the notice of sale.
170. See the text immediately following note 43 supra. By way of illustration, con-
sider the following example. Suppose that the fair market value of property sold at a
trustee's sale is $25,000, that the outstanding balance of the obligation is $20.000, and
that the costs of the private sale are $350. The amount of the lender's bid at the sale
would be $20,350, the outstanding balance plus the costs of sale. The borrower would
receive nothing for his equity. If the addition of notice and a hearing increased the costs
of the sale to $500, the amount of the lender's bid would be $20,500. Again the borrower
would receive nothing for his equity, so the added costs do not directly affect the bor-
rower's position. While lenders may have to bear these increased costs if federal mort-
gage insurance programs are not applicable (see note 171 infra), these added costs can
be spread among all home buyers through very slight increases in interest rates.
171. If the borrower is insured, federal mortgage insurance programs usually pay
the costs of the foreclosure sale, judicial or private. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1706c et
seq. (1970) (Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance); 38 U.S.C. § 1810 et
seq. (1970) (Veteran's Administration mortgage insurance). As only 0.3 to 0.5 percent
of all mortgage loans are foreclosed, see Comment, Power of Sale Foreclosure After
Fuentes, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 206, 212 (1972), any increase in the cost of a private deed
of trust foreclosure would have only a minimal effect on the total cost of mortgage in-
surance and could be distributed evenly to all federally insured home buyers by small
increases in the cost of federal mortgage insurance.
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stantial protections for the borrower have a detrimental effect on lend-
ers' interests in a private deed of trust foreclosure?
The requirement of notice and a hearing before a deprivation of
property occurs can result in an increased delay before a creditor re-
covers possession of secured property after default and arguably can
increase the creditor's loss. While few lawyers and judges would dis-
pute the necessity for due process protections to prevent unfair or mis-
taken deprivations of property when the untested claims of an unse-
cured creditor form the basis for summary state action,172 deep differ-
ences of opinion regarding the necessity for notice and a hearing can
arise when the creditor has a security interest in the disputed
property. 7 3 Justice White, dissenting in Fuentes, reasonedthat after de-
fault a secured creditor's interest in minimizing his loss-the interest of
preventing further use and deterioration of the property174-is as deserv-
ing of protection as the debtor's interest in the secured property.'7 5
Justice White would have preferred to balance the conflicting
property interests rather than provide due process protections to the
debtor at the expense of the secured creditor. 7 6 However, in a deed of
trust foreclosure under the Washington Act, lenders do not appear to
have a significant property interest in preventing further use and dete-
rioration of the property. Unlike personalty, real property is not sub-
ject to rapid deterioration in value. More importantly, as is discussed
below, the Washington Act expressly prohibits a private trustee's sale
immediately after default.
172. Several of the recent due process cases were decided by a unanimous or near
unanimous Court. For example, in Sniadach the vote was 8-1, in Bell, 9-0 (three justices
concurred without opinion.)
173. The Fuentes Court was divided 4-3. (Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and
Marshall comprised the majority, while Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and
Blackmun dissented. The author of the Fuentes dissent, Justice White, had not dissented
in any of the previous procedural due process cases listed in note 24 supra.) The creditor
in Fuentes had a security interest in the property being summarily replevied.
174. 407 U.S. at 102 (White, J., dissenting).
175. Id. Justice White readily admitted that a debtor has a significant property in-
terest (the right to use and possession) in secured property, but only so long as the debtor
makes the required installment payments. Id. at 99. Justice White employed a similar
analysis in his majority opinion in Lindsey, discussed in note 157 supra.
176. 407 U.S. at 100-02. The Fitentes majority refused to directly consider
whether a secured creditor has a significant property interest which must be balanced
against the debtor's property interests after an alleged default because it was unwill-
ing to believe a creditor's contention that a default had occurred until that contention
had been tested in open court. Id. at 83. On the contrary, Justice White was willing
to believe the creditor's contention without requiring a prior hearing. Id. at 100.
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When a default does occur, a lender's goal is simple-minimize the
loss by acquiring title and possession of the particular property as
soon as possible. It was to implement this goal that lenders pressed for
adoption of the Washington Deed of Trust Act. While the Act gives
the trustee the power to sell the property privately after a default and
precludes any redemption after the sale, 177 it nevertheless affords
some protection to the borrower by expressly providing: "The sale as
authorized under this chapter shall not take place less than six months
from the date of default in the obligation secured." 178 The outcome of
this legislative compromise is straightforward. The borrower can re-
tain possession of the premises for at least six months after default. 179
The lender cannot obtain title and possession of the property until the
expiration of the same six-month period. 180
Given this automatic six-month delay, the lender is not affected by
what happens after the trustee is notified of the default; indeed, the
lender probably wishes to see the default cured. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the borrower is affected by the mechanics of the foreclosure
process, losing much of the alienability of his land and a substantial
amount of equity early in the procedure. The recording of the notice
of sale and the contemporaneous addition of substantial trustee's costs
can often impair the borrower's ability to cure the default, to the det-
riment of both the lender and the borrower. As the present mechanics
of a private deed of trust foreclosure deprive the borrower of substan-
tial property interests early in the procedure without benefitting the
lender, and as the Washington Act can be amended to provide the
borrower with due process protections without affecting the lenders'
177. But .ee note 4 supra, discussing the Federal Tax Lien Act.
178. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.040(6) (Supp. 1972). In practice, this six-month figure is
seldom obtained. Most lenders do not declare a debtor in default and notify the trustee
until the third month after the initial default. After notification, because of the require-
ment of 120 days of recorded notice before the sale, it takes the trustee at least another
four months to hold the sale. The legislature, in its wisdom, may have intended a
seven- to nine-month delay before the foreclosure sale.
179. This six-month "redemption" period is considerably shorter than the borrow-
er's one-year or eight-month statutory redemption period after a judicial foreclosure of a
homestead. (See note 9 supra.) The relatively liberal protections afforded to borrowers
through homestead exemptions and lengthy redemption periods may stem from the
Washington State Constitution, which provides: "The legislature shall protect by law from
forced sale a certain portion of the homestead and other property of all heads of fami-
lies." WASH. CONST. art. XIX, § 1.
180. In addition, lenders are prohibited from obtaining a deficiency judgment.
WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.100 (Supp. 1972).
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interests (as will be shown in the following section), there should be no
serious policy objections to the constitutionally required changes.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR CHANGE
Since the Washington Deed of Trust Act appears to violate due
process of law, it is necessary to amend the Act so as to provide the
borrower with notice and an opportunity to be heard before a depri-
vation of property occurs. The necessary hearing cannot depend upon
the borrower's shouldering the burden of initiating a court action; the
borrower must be provided an automatic opportunity to be heard-
an opportunity which requires little more than appearing in court at
an appointed time.18' Even though the hearing is subject to waiver
and there is a likelihood that many borrowers will not appear, it is
clear that the opportunity to be heard must be provided by statute. It
follows, then, that one of the parties to the deed of trust instrument
should have a statutory burden of filing suit against the borrower to
obtain judicial approval of the forthcoming private foreclosure. To
avoid a conflict with the trustee's traditional role,182 it seems necessary
to require the lender to institute suit against the borrower.
The Deed of Trust Act should require the lender to establish in the
court action that a default has occurred, that the statutory require-
ments of notice have been or will be met, that the costs incurred by
the trustee are reasonable, and that the trustee is entitled to (1) record
18 1. If the borrower is given an automatic opportunity for a hearing but does not
appear in court after adequate notice, the hearing requirement has nonetheless been sat-
isfied. See note 144 and accompanying text supra.
182. The Washington Deed of Trust Act both prohibits the same person (legal
or natural) from acting as both trustee and beneficiary and precludes the trustee and
the beneficiary from entering an agency relationship. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.020
(Supp. 1972). In practice this provision of the Act often is ignored, giving rise to
litigation. See, e.g., Foos v. Webster, No. 758705 (King Co. Super. Ct. 1972); Farley
v. Metropolitan Mortgage & Sec. Co., No 764555 (King Co. Super. Ct. 1973). Al-
though there are no appellate decisions in Washington concerning the trustee's relation-
ship to the parties in a deed of trust, the problem has long been the subject of judi-
cial inquiry. See, e.g., National Life Ins. Co. v. Silverman, 454 F.2d 899, 915 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) ("Trustees under deeds of trust also have the duty to act for the benefit of
both parties, borrower as well as lender, and to be impartial; . . . [t] he same good
faith is required of trustees under a deed of trust of real estate as is required of other
fiduciaries"); Spruill v. Ballard, 58 F.2d 517, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ("[T]he law
requires of a trustee ... that he act fairly toward both parties and in the best interest
of each and not for the exclusive benefit of either, because, after he has acted, the
right of redemption is lost.").
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the notice of sale, and (2) conduct a private sale a short time there-
after.
A. The Timing of the Hearing
The opportunity for a hearing must precede any deprivation of the
borrower's property that is not de minimis. Since the recording of the
notice of sale deprives the borrower of the continued alienability and
some of the equity in the land, 183 it would seem necessary to provide
for notice and a hearing prior to the recording of the notice of sale.
Provision for a hearing at this early stage of the proceeding would
best accomplish the goal of "minimiz [ing] substantively unfair or
mistaken deprivations of property."1 84 If the borrower wants to con-
test the lender's claim of default or to raise collateral defenses, 8 5 it
still would be possible to use the land itself as a source of revenue to
retain an attorney. Of equal importance, when coupled with suggested
changes in the required notice,186 a provision for an early hearing may
impel the borrower to raise the money necessary to cure the default
prior to the time of the hearing. Again, the land itself may be a source
of funds at this early stage in the proceeding. Finally, even if the only
issue is the amount of costs incurred by the trustee, an early hearing
would permit judicial supervision of those costs, potentially increasing
the borrower's ability to cure the default.
All of the advantages of a hearing prior to the recording of the no-
tice of sale become equivalent disadvantages if the time of the hearing
is delayed until just prior to the trustee's sale, after the notice of sale
has been recorded. The loss of alienability and equity may prohibit
the borrower from obtaining legal representation at the hearing or
from curing the default before the hearing.
In sum, to comply with the requirements of due process and to
maximize the borrower's protections, it would seem necessary to
schedule the time of the required hearing before the recording of the
notice of sale. As will be discussed below,187 in order to protect the
183. See the text accompanying notes 44-76 supra.
184. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81.
185. See, e.g., the discussion of Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Ostrander, 6 Wn. App. 28.
491 P.2d 1058 (1971), in the text accompanying notes 161-63 stupra.
186. See the discussion in the text immediately following note 196 infra.
187. See the discussion in the text accompanying note 195 infra.
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lenders' interests, it seems logical to reschedule the recording of the
notice of sale to a time just prior to the actual trustee's sale.
B. The Scope of the Hearing
It is clear from the recent procedural due process cases that the
form of the required opportunity to be heard is subject to variances
"cappropriate to the nature of the case." 188 The form of the hearing
appropriately is affected by (1) the simplicity of the issues; 189 (2) the
length of time of the deprivation; 90 (3) the relative weight of liberty or
property interests involved;191 and (4) the nature of the subsequent
proceedings, if any.'9 2
Application of these four factors to a deed of trust foreclosure
clearly indicates the scope of the required hearing. First, the issues
involved in a deed of trust foreclosure are likely to be simple factual
determinations. Has the borrower defaulted? Are there any defenses,
legal or equitable, to the default? Has the trustee incurred unnecessary
or exorbitant costs or failed to comply with the notice requirements
of the Act? While more complicated issues such as allegations of fraud
by the use of a deed of trust represented to be a mortgage' 93 undoubt-
edly will arise, hearings which involve detailed inquiry into the appli-
cable facts or law probably will be the exception rather than the rule.
Second, while the deprivation of property at the time of the recording
of the notice of sale in theory will be only temporary, the deprivation
of property at the trustee's sale will be permanent. Third, the property
interests involved often will be of the highest importance; courts and
legislatures traditionally have guarded the possessory interests of a
"homeowner" with the utmost jealousy. Finally, because it makes little
sense from an economic or policy viewpoint to have both a probable
cause hearing at an early stage in the proceeding (such as before the
recording of the notice of sale) and then a later trial on the merits
188. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82, quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
189. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 87 n.18, citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65
(1972).
190. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 86.
191. Id. at 90 n.21, citing Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378.
192. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82, citing Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378.
193. See the discussion of Ostrander in the text accompanying notes 161-63 supra.
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(prior to the trustee's sale), it is unlikely that there will be subsequent
proceedings.
The importance of the property interest involved, the permanence
of the deprivation, and the lack of any subsequent proceeding all sug-
gest that a full trial on the merits is necessary. Fortunately, the prob-
able simplicity of the issues suggests that such a trial would not consti-
tute an unworkable intrusion in the deed of trust foreclosure mecha-
nism.
C. Notice
The present notice provisions are subject to constitutional criticism
for failure to alert the recipient of an opportunity to be heard. 94
Therefore, it is necessary to include in the statutorily required notice a
provision fully explaining to the borrower the approximate time and
nature of the forthcoming opportunity to be heard. Other changes in
the notice provision will be suggested below.
D. General Considerations
In the spirit of preventing "unfair or mistaken deprivations of prop-
erty," we suggest that in addition to providing for notice and a hearing
prior to a deprivation of property, any proposal for statutory change
should attempt to maximize the borrower's opportunity to cure the
default. To achieve this goal, we suggest four guidelines:
(1) the borrower's ability to alienate his interest in the land should not
be impaired any earlier than necessary,
(2) the requisite costs of the foreclosure sale should not be incurred
until the latest possible time,
(3) the borrower should be appraised of the gravity of the situation as
early as possible,
(4) the borrower should always be fully advised of the exact amount
necessary to cure the default.
From the borrower's point of view, any statute which reflects the
guidelines listed above while still complying with due process require-
ments should result in substantial improvements in the deed of trust
foreclosure mechanism.
194. See the text accompanying notes 132-35 supra.
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To achieve these goals and to comply with due process require-
ments, we believe that three major changes in the Washington Act are
mandatory. First, the recording of the notice of sale should be
changed from early in the proceeding to a time just prior to the sale
(for example, thirty days prior to sale). Second, the legislature should
adopt a mechanism for providing prompt, expedited trials before a
deprivation of property occurs. Third, at the earliest possible stage in
the foreclosure proceeding, the trustee should be required by statute to
provide the borrower complete information concerning the amount
necessary to cure the default and the consequences of delay in curing
the default.
An obvious solution to the necessity of providing for notice and a
hearing before the recording of the notice of sale would be to delay
the time of the recording (and of the notice to interested parties) until
thirty days prior to the trustee's sale. This change would substantially
benefit the borrower, for it would provide an additional ninety days of
unimpaired alienability after a default occurs. In addition, by post-
poning the costs of a title search, recording fees, and (perhaps) the
necessity for consultation with an attorney until late in the proceeding,
the change would minimize the added trustee's costs and maximize the
borrower's opportunity to cure the default early in the proceeding. 195
Both the conclusion that the hearing required by due process
should be a full trial on the merits and that it must precede the re-
cording of the notice of sale highlight an urgent need for change in the
court procedure. On the one hand, the required hearing could in-
crease the workload of the courts; on the other, it is necessary to keep
the total length of time necessary to effectuate a deed of trust foreclo-
sure to a minimum in order to protect lenders' interests. Unless the
legislature decides to abandon "private" deed of trust foreclosures al-
together in favor of conventional judicial foreclosures, it will be neces-
sary to furnish a mechanism for providing prompt, expedited trials
after an alleged default but prior to the recording of the notice of sale.
195. In the 1965 Act, the notice of sale was to be recorded 180 days before the sale.
The 1967 amendments to the Act shortened this time period to 120 days (see text ac-
companying note 14 supra) and added a provision prohibiting the sale from occurring
less than six months after default. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.040(6) (Supp. 1972). Now
that the earliest possible time the trustee's sale can occur is separately fixed by statute,
there seems to be no practical reason for requiring a 120 day delay between the re-
cording of the notice of sale and the sale itself. Usually the only bidder at the sale will be
the lender and the amount of the bid will be the outstanding balance of the trust deed
note. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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The procedural prerequisites for this new expedited proceeding could
be modeled after an unlawful detainer proceeding. 196
To truly maximize the borrower's ability to cure the default, the
notice provisions of the Washington Act should be changed. The bor-
rower's best chance to cure the default is early in the foreclosure
process, before the lender commences legal action. To ensure that a
borrower acts during this crucial time period, the trustee should be
required to give the borrower more adequate notice. For example, on
receiving a notice of default, the trustee could be required to send a
first notice to the borrower informing him that the lender has declared
him in default, that suit will be instituted against him by the lender in
thirty or sixty days, that a notice of sale will be recorded in approxi-
mately ninety days, and that a trustee's sale probably will occur in
120 days unless the borrower cures the default or successfully defends
the suit. t9 7 Ideally, this first notice should contain an exact statement
of the total amount necessary to cure the default within the next thirty
days and for each succeeding thirty-day period. A provision for such
notice would ensure that a borrower is alerted to the gravity of the sit-
uation at the earliest possible time and made fully aware of the inevi-
table consequences of his failure to cure the default.
In summary, it is our hope that by following the suggested guide-
lines and adopting the three proposed changes, the legislature will
conform the Washington Deed of Trust Act to the requirements of
procedural due process. This result could be reached without in-
creasing the length of time necessary to effectuate a deed of trust fore-
closure.
CONCLUSION
In its present form the Washington Deed of Trust Act appears to
violate due process of law. Pursuant to its provisions, borrowers are
196. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 59.12 (1959). The summons issued pursuant to the un-
lawful detainer statute is returnable not less than six nor more than twelve days from the
date of service. Id. § 59.12.070. However, the scope of the hearing must be broader than
the limited inquiry of an unlawful detainer proceeding. See notes 161-63 and accom-
panying text supra.
197. While the borrower may have received similar information from the lender be-
fore a default was declared, we suggest that such direct and immediate notice from the
trustee would better alert the borrower to the gravity of the situation. Additionally. the
trustee costs added by this required notice should be minimal, because no title search
would be necessary (only the borrower and lender need receive a copy).
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deprived of significant property interests by state action in a
non-exceptional situation without prior notice and a hearing. Given
the stringent standards for waiver, it is unlikely that borrowers have
validly waived their due process rights in existing deed of trust instru-
ments.
Accordingly, the Washington Act should be amended to conform
with due process requirements. It appears necessary to furnish bor-
rowers notice and an automatic opportunity for a full trial on the
merits prior to the recording of the notice of sale. For this and other
reasons, it seems sensible to delay the recording of the notice of sale
until approximately thirty days before the trustee's sale. Moreover, to
maximize the borrower's ability to cure his default, it seems appro-
priate to require the trustee to furnish more timely and detailed notice
to the borrower immediately after receiving a default notice. These
changes should provide substantial new protections to borrowers
without detriment to lenders. By maximizing the borrower's oppor-
tunity to cure the default, the changes actually may benefit both par-
ties.
Notwithstanding the constitutional mandate and the practical ne-
cessity for change, the courts traditionally are reluctant to impose
their concepts of procedural due process upon a system created by
legislative design. It is to be hoped that the Washington Legislature
will assume the responsibility for change that the courts often are
forced to undertake as a last resort.
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